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Abstract
 
Spam e-mails have become a serious technological 
and economic problem. So far we have been 
reasonably able to resist spam e-mails and use the 
Internet for regular communication by deploying 
complementary anti-spam approaches. However, if 
we are to avert the danger of losing the Internet e-
mail service as a valuable, free, and worldwide 
medium of open communication, anti-spam activities 
should be performed more systematically than is done 
in current, mainly heuristic, anti-spam approaches. A 
formal framework within which the modes of spam 
delivery, anti-spam approaches, and their 
effectiveness can be investigated, may encourage a 
shift in methodology and pave the way for new, 
holistic anti-spam approaches.  
This paper presents a model of the Internet e-mail 
infrastructure as a directed graph and a deterministic 
finite automaton, and draws on automata theory to 
formally derive the modes of spam delivery possible. 
Finally the effectiveness of anti-spam approaches in 
terms of coverage of spamming modes is assessed.  
 
. 
1. Introduction 
 
Spam e-mails have become a serious technological 
and economic problem. So far we have been 
reasonably able to resist spam e-mails, although 
statistics show a proportion of spam higher than 60% 
[11, 12].  The availability of the Internet e-mail 
system for regular e-mail communication is currently 
ensured by complementary anti-spam approaches, 
mainly by blocking and filtering procedures. 
However, if we are to avert the danger of losing the 
Internet e-mail service as a valuable, free, and 
worldwide medium of open communication, anti-
spam activities should be performed more 
systematically than is done in current, mainly 
heuristic, anti-spam approaches. A formal framework 
within which the modes of spam delivery, anti-spam 
approaches, and their effectiveness can be 
investigated, may encourage a shift in methodology 
and pave the way for new, holistic anti-spam 
approaches. In Section 2 the Internet e-mail 
infrastructure is modeled as a directed graph and a 
deterministic finite automaton and the appropriateness 
of the model is proved. In section 3 all possible 
modes of sending (spam) e-mails are derived and 
presented as regular expressions. These (technically-
oriented) expressions are then grouped into categories 
according to types of organization participating in e-
mail delivery. The effectiveness of today’s most 
important anti-spam approaches is assessed in section 
4 by matching them with the modes of spamming. 
Section 5 summarizes the results presented in this 
manuscript and outlines future work. 
 
2. Model of the Internet e-mail 
infrastructure 
 
The Internet e-mail infrastructure can be modeled 
as a directed graph G which is defined in the first 
subsection. In the second subsection it is shown that 
all types of e-mail deliveries can be described with a 
set of (directed) paths in G. As each option to send e-
mails at the same time represents an option to send 
spam e-mails the set of spamming options and the set 
of mailing options are regarded to be equal. 
 
2.1 Definition  
 
Since the Internet e-mail network infrastructure 
which the graph is intended to represent is dynamic, it 
is not meaningful to model each concrete e-mail node. 
The different types of Internet e-mail nodes on the 
other hand are static, and it is these which can serve 
the purpose. An e-mail node is here defined as a 
software unit which is involved in the Internet e-mail 
delivery process and works on the TCP/IP application 
layer. Consideration of software working exclusively 
on lower levels such as routers and bridges is beyond 
the scope of this work, as are options to send an e-
mail without any SMTP communication with an e-
mail node of the recipient’s organization. However, 
this does not seem to be an important restriction, as 
almost all e-mail users receive their e-mails from a 
server that is (directly or indirectly) SMTP connected 
to the Internet. 
Let G={V,E,c} be a directed graph with vertex set 
V and edge set E, and let c: E→L be a total function 
on E where L denotes a set of (protocol) labels. First 
the structure of the graph is presented graphically (see 
figure 1) and formally. Its semantics is then explained 
in more detail. 
The set of vertices can be depicted as the disjoint 
union of five vertex sets V1,…,V5. Each of these sets 
is attached to one of the organizational units 
participating in e-mail delivery: sender, sending 
organization or e-mail (service) provider, Internet, 
receiving organization, and recipient. In cases where 
the recipient does not use a receiving organization as 
e-mail service provider (ESP) but runs his own e-mail 
receiving and processing environment the 
organizational units receiving organization and 
recipient merge. This, however, does not affect the 
structure of the graph, which retains its general 
validity. The set of vertices be V=V1∪…∪V5 with 
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The set of (protocol) labels be  
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E and c are not defined formally here, but shown 
graphically in figure 1.  
Each vertex corresponds to a type of e-mail node. 
An edge e=(v1,v2) with a label c(e) ∈ L attached 
exists if and only if the Internet e-mail infrastructure 
allows e-mail flow between the corresponding node 
types; c(e) denotes the set of feasible protocols. 
The set SMTP contains SMTP (as a protocol) 
extended by all IANA-registered SMTP service 
extensions, also referred to as ESMTP, such as SMTP 
Service Extension for Authentication (RFC 2554), 
Deliver By SMTP Service Extension (RFC 2852), 
SMTP Service Extension for Returning Enhanced 
Error (RFC 2034), and SMTP Service Extension for 
Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security (RFC 
3207); see www.iana.org/assignments/mail-
parameters for a list of SMTP service extensions. 
The set 
*SMTP contains the set SMTP and all 
SMTP extensions specified for e-mail submission 
from a Mail User Agent (MUA) to an e-mail node 
with an SMTP incoming interface. This e-mail node 
can be a Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) as specified in 
RFC 2821 or a Message Submission Agent (MSA) as 
specified in RFC 2476. With reference to the latter  
inc
sendOrgMTA  can alternatively be denoted as 
sendOrgMSA  and 
inc
recOrgMTA as recOrgMSA ,respectively. 
Port 587 is reserved for e-mail message submission. 
However, while most e-mail clients and servers can 
be configured to use port 587 instead of 25, there are 
cases where this is not possible or convenient. A site 
may use port 25 even for message submission. Using 
an MSA numerous methods can be applied to ensure 
that only authorized users can submit messages. 
These methods include authenticated SMTP, IP 
address restrictions, secure IP, and prior Post Office 
Protocol (POP) authentication, where clients are 
required to authenticate their identity before an SMTP 
submission session (“SMTP after POP”). *SMTP is 
the union of three sets of protocols. The first contains 
all Internet application protocols excepting SMTP*, 
the second, all proprietary application protocols used 
on the Internet: this inclusion takes tunneling 
procedures into account. The third set, since use of 
application protocols is not mandatory for the 
exchange of data in a network, are all Internet 
protocols on the transport and network layer of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) model, such as TCP 
and IP. MAP is the set of all e-mail access protocols 
used to transfer e-mails from the recipient’s e-mail 
server to his MUA. Internet Message Access Protocol 
(IMAP) version 4 (RFC 1730) and POP version 3 
(RFC 1939) are here among the protocols most 
deployed. The set HTTP(S) contains the protocols 
HTTP (RFC 2616) as well as its secure versions 
“HTTP over SSL” [3] and “HTTP over TLS” 
(RFC2818). Finally, the set INT denotes protocols 
and procedures for internal e-mail delivery, i. e. inside 
the receiving organization, such as getting e-mails 
from an internal MTA and storing them into the 
users’ e-mail boxes. 
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Figure 1: Internet e-mail infrastructure as directed graph 
2.2 Appropriateness 
 
The meaning of G in the context of e-mail delivery 
is given by the fact that the different types of e-mail 
delivery can be described by a set of specific 
(directed) paths in G. Before this issue is formally 
addressed in proposition 1, it will be shown that each 
type of e-mail node corresponds to a vertex in G: 
Lemma 1 Let T be the set of types of e-mail nodes 
involved in e-mail delivery. Then there is a bijection 
between T and V. 
The proof of lemma 1 is given in the Appendix. It 
should be noted that the e-mail nodes are logical 
nodes representing software, some of which may fall 
in one physical node in a particular instance of e-mail 
delivery (e.g. inc
recOrgMTA  and  recOrgMDA ). 
Given Lemma 1, we can now proof the following  
Proposition 1 Let 21 ),,...,(
≥∈= Nksss k ,  be a 
sequence of types of e-mail nodes involved  in a 
complete1 e-mail delivery and S the set of all feasible 
sequences, i.e. all types of e-mail delivery. Let p be a 
(directed) path in G between two vertices 
                                                 
1 By “complete” I mean that the e-mail has reached the 
recipient’s e-mail box on his e-mail server or the MTA of the 
receiving organization which applies a forwarding rule or rejects 
the message. That is, forwarding an e-mail and sending a bounce e-
mail starts a new sequence. Furthermore, only those e-mail 
deliveries are regarded which are either initiated by a sender's client 
or, in case of bouncing or forwarding e-mails, by an ESP’s MTA.  
},{1
inc
sendOrgsendOrgstartstart MTAMTAVVv ∪=∈  and 
},,{ increcOrgrecOrgrecOrgendend MTAMTAMailServVv =∈  
and P the set of all these paths. Then there is a 
bijection f between S and P. 
The proof of proposition 1 is given in the 
Appendix. Proposition 1 provides the basis for 
formally representing modes of sending an (spam) e-
mail. System security violations, caused by, e.g., 
viruses, Trojan horses, or worms, which may affect e-
mail nodes belonging to a sending or receiving 
organization are not considered here. Possible 
violations in users’ systems, which are more relevant 
anyway, are, however, included. 
Each of the possibilities of sending one e-mail also 
permits the sending of a number of e-mails, as is the 
case with the millions of e-mails spammers send. So, 
to identify all the possibilities of sending spam e-
mails we must consider the set of possibilities of 
sending one e-mail. Since these are represented by the 
set of all paths in G from Vstart to Vend, we are now 
provided with a formal approach to the modes of 
spamming available. 
 
3. Model and classification of spamming 
options 
 
The graph G will serve as a basis for deriving all 
modes of spamming. It provides a formal framework 
within which the effectiveness of (present and future) 
technological anti-spam measures can be theoretically 
analyzed. It also shows all possible spam delivery 
routes which any holistic anti-spam measures would 
need to cover. 
The modes of spamming are formally presented in 
the first subsection. A classification of them follows 
in the second subsection. 
 
3.1 Modes of spamming 
 
For the sake of simplification, we consider all 
paths from Vstart to MailServrecOrg, denoted as P'. For 
simplification, all paths from Vstart to MailServrecOrg 
are regarded, denoted with P'. Now that P’ is 
identified, we obtain, by simply extensions, all the 
paths from Vstart to Vend, i.e. P. P' is arrived at 
applying some basic ideas from automata theory: the 
graph G is transformed into a Deterministic Finite 
Automaton (DFA) A=(S,Σ,δ,Start,F) where S is a 
finite set of states, Σ is an alphabet, Start is the initial 
state, F ⊆ S is the set of final states, and δ is a 
function from S x Σ to S. This automaton recognizes a 
language that (bijectively) corresponds to P', such that 
w=(w1,…, wn)∈L(A) ⇔ (w1,…,wn)∈P, where L(A) is 
the language recognized by A. The construction is 
self-evident and can be described informally as 
follows. The set of states S corresponds to the nodes 
of G extended by an artificial state Start which serves 
as the initial state, ∑ corresponds to the nodes of G, as 
well. An edge (v1,v2) means that the transition 
function δ includes δ(s1,s2)=s2, i.e. state s2 is reached 
if and only if the symbol s2 is “read” by A. In order to 
account for the starting node, δ also needs to include 
δ(Start,s2)=s2 with s2 being a state corresponding to 
any node of the set of starting nodes Vstart. F only 
contains the state corresponding to the node 
inc
recOrgMTA . 
The language recognized by the DFA A – and thus 
P' – can be described with a regular expression 
because of the equivalence between DFAs and 
regular expressions. For simplicity, the states are 
labeled with capital letters which are assigned to the 
corresponding nodes (see figure 1); elements of ∑ are 
set in lower case letters. Given two regular 
expressions r1 and r2, ~ denotes the relationship 
between r1 and r2 with r1~r2: ⇔ L(r1)=L(r2); Λ be the 
regular expression with L(Λ)=ε. Using the edges of G 
we get L(A)=L(Start) with 
 
Start ~ aA ∨ bB ∨ cC ∨ dD ∨ fF (1) 
A  ~ kK ∨ gG ∨ dD ∨ hH  (2) 
B  ~ dD ∨ gG ∨ eE ∨ hH  (3) 
C  ~ iI   ∨ jJ   (4) 
D  ~ kK ∨  fF ∨  gG ∨ hH  (5) 
E  ~ dD    (6) 
F  ~ kK ∨ gG ∨  fF ∨ hH  (7) 
G  ~ kK ∨ gG ∨  hH   (8) 
H  ~ jJ   ∨ iI   (9) 
I  ~ hH ∨ gG ∨ kK    (10) 
J  ~ iI   ∨ jJ   (11) 
K  ~ Λ    (12) 
 
Let α, β, γ be regular expressions, then recursive 
relationships can be dissolved using the rule 
α ~ βα ∨ γ, ε ∉ L(β) (13) 
α ~ β*γ 
(1) can be solved by application of simple 
substitutions and multiple application of rule (13), 
yielding: 
Start ~ ak ∨ agg*k ∨ agg*hH ∨ ad (k ∨ ff*k ∨  
    ff*gg* ∨ ff*gg*hH ∨ ff*hH ∨ gg*k ∨  
 gg*hH ∨ hH) ∨ ahH ∨ (bd ∨ bed) (k ∨ ff*k       
 ∨  ff*gg*k ∨ ff*gg*hH ∨ ff*hH ∨ gg*k ∨  
 gg*hH ∨ hH) ∨ bgg*k ∨ bgg*hH ∨ bhH ∨  
 cihH ∨ cigGH ∨ cigg*k ∨ cik ∨ cjj*ihH ∨  
 cjj*igg*H ∨ cjj*igg*k ∨ cjj*ik ∨ d ( k  ∨ 
 ff*k ∨ff*gg*k ∨ ff*gg*hH ∨ ff*hH ∨ gg*k ∨  
 gg*hH ∨ hH) ∨ ff*k ∨ ff*gg*k ∨ ff*gg*hH ∨  
 ff*hH     (14) 
with  
H ~ (jj*I ( h ∨ gg*h ) ∨ I ( h ∨gg*h ))* 
    (jj*igg*k ∨ jj*ik ∨igg*k ∨ ik) (15) 
 
As (14) shows, the infrastructural modes of 
sending a(n) (spam) e-mail are numerous and should 
therefore be grouped appropriately.  
 
3.2 Spamming categories 
 
Grouping can be done by subsuming those options 
in which the same types of organizational units 
participate. As the receiving organization participates 
in each complete e-mail delivery process and the 
recipient does not affect the delivery process these 
two units are not integrated into the classification. 
Accordingly, the set of spamming categories results 
from the integration of a local sender, an ESP and the 
Internet (application level infrastructure) which 
provides eights options. The options (groups, 
categories) are defined and explained in table 1. The 
cases in which neither a local sender nor an ESP is 
involved are only theoretical ones. The model 
requires a sender or sending organization to appear 
before any Internet  e-mail  node:  an   e-mail  either  
starts from a node residing on ESP’s side or on local 
side  included  those  cases  in  which computers were 
XX
Spammer uses local client; 
use of e-mail provider (via 
dial-in or LAN connection)V
XXX
Spammer uses local client; 
use of e-mail provider (via 
dial-in or LAN connection) 
which uses intermediate
Internet nodes like relays
VI
XX
Spammer uses local client; 
use of intermediate Internet 
nodes like relays (via dial-in
or LAN connection)
IV
X
Spammer uses local client;  
direct connection to 
MTArecOrg (via dial-in or LAN 
connection)
III
XX
Provider itself spams or its
MTAs were corrupted; use
of intermediate Internet 
nodes like relays
II
X
Provider itself spams or its
MTAs were corrupted; direct
connection to MTArecOrg
I
X--
--
InternetSendingorganizationSenderScenarioNo.
 
Table 1: Spamming categories 
infected or controlled remotely. Scenarios I and II 
refer to ESPs being corrupt or featuring corrupt 
MTAs. As the number of ESPs and their MTAs is 
significantly lower than the number of people these 
spamming options should be addressable effectively. 
In all other scenarios the spammer uses a local client 
which seems much more likely and easier for the 
spammer. Scenario III describes those cases in which 
a spammer does not use an ESP but, of course, an 
Internet service provider (ISP) operating not higher 
than on transport layer, i.e. simple forwarding 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packets. As in 
this scenario the spammer connects directly with an 
MTA of the receiving organization he is restricted to 
the e-mail ports implemented there. Usually, port 25 
or 587 is used. This makes it easy for ISPs to prevent 
most spam e-mails sent that way by simply blocking 
TCP packets to these ports. Scenario 4 is much harder 
to address as spammers use Internet nodes including 
gateways and thus are not restricted to ports 25 and 
587. In Scenario V the spammer uses an ESP to send 
spam e-mails thereby abusing the e-mail service. 
Even if the number of e-mails per day and account is 
restricted it remains challenging to prevent the 
spammer from setting up new accounts automatically. 
Scenario VI seems quite unlikely. It refers to a 
spammer who uses an ESP who forwards e-mails by 
sending them to intermediate nodes in the Internet. 
This might occur if the ESP supports spamming 
activities of customers. Grouping the spamming 
options of (14) according to the six categories shown 
in table 1 yields after some transformations: 
Start ~ 
 I:   d ( k ∨ ff*k ) ∨ ff*k ∨ 
 II:  (d ∨ Λ) (ff*gg*k ∨ ff*gg*hH ∨ ff*hH) ∨ 
       d ( gg*k ∨ gg*hH ∨ hH) ∨ 
 III: ak ∨ 
 IV: (a ∨ b) (gg*k ∨ gg*hH ∨ hH) ∨ cj*i(hH  
        ∨ gg*H ∨ gg*k ∨ k) ∨ 
 V:   (ad ∨ bd ∨ bed) (k ∨ ff*k) ∨ 
 VI:  (ad ∨ bd ∨ bed) (ff*gg*k ∨ ff*gg*hH ∨  
          ff*hH ∨ gg*k ∨ gg*hH ∨ hH) 
 
with  
H ~ (jj*I ( h ∨ gg*h ) ∨ I ( h ∨gg*h ))* 
    (jj*igg*k ∨ jj*ik ∨igg*k ∨ ik) 
 
4. Effectiveness of anti-spam approaches 
 
The effectiveness of the most discussed and 
deployed anti-spam approaches is assessed on a  
theoretical and qualitative level, any quantitative and 
empirical results are out of scope of this manuscript. 
Table 2 shows which spamming options can be 
effectively addressed by which anti-spam approach. 
An “x” indicates an effective coverage, a blank entry 
means that no effective coverage is possible. 
Some anti-spam approaches have general impacts on 
spam, i.e. their effectiveness do not depend on the 
way the spam was sent. Filter, blocking mechanisms 
basing on gray lists, and address obscuring techniques 
belong to these approaches and are thus not included 
in table 2. Filter (programs) heuristically classify 
incoming e-mails into ham and spam e-mails. They 
prescind from the spamming option and solely focus 
on the e-mail document which has already received 
by the organization’s incoming mail server 
inc
recOrgMTA or even by the user’s mail client recMUA . 
Spam filters can be categorized according to the type 
of filtering method (e.g. statistical filters [4] or neural 
network-based filters – version 3 of the open-source 
spam filter software SpamAssassin uses a neural 
network)  and according to the e-mail parts inspected 
by the filter: the header and/or the body can be 
filtered. All filters suffer from the same drawbacks: 
? As they are heuristic approaches they might 
classify incorrectly: spam e-mails might pass 
the filter (“false-negatives“), ham e-mails 
might be filtered and probably even deleted 
(“false-positives“). 
? Spammers are forced to send even more e-
mails to compensate filters’ success. 
Local MTA or MUA, then MTA(s) of provider, 
then at least gateway(s)
(ad ∨ bd ∨ bed)
(ff*hH ∨ hH)
VI
xx
Local MTA or MUA, then
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Table 2: Effectiveness of anti-spam approaches 
? The goal of filters is not to prevent spam but to 
detect it. But when spam e-mails are detected 
on recipient’s site resources (e.g. band width, 
storage capacity, CPU time reserved for filter 
software) already have been consumed. 
? Spammers continue upgrading their skills and 
it is doubtful if filters can be created which are 
effective in the long-term. 
Gray lists [6] are used for temporarily blocking 
incoming e-mails: They take advantage of the fact 
that spamming e-mail MTAs often don’t implement 
the standardized “resume feature” according to which 
a once rejected e-mail is sent again after some 
minutes. If the same e-mail arrives a second time in a 
specific time window it may pass. For example, the 
RWTH Aachen University has implemented a gray 
list system that stores the IP of the sending host, the 
sender address, and the recipient address. However, 
once spammer can access a pool of valid e-mail 
addresses which might have been stolen, bought, or 
harvested, they certainly will implement the resume 
feature thus bypassing the gray list approach. 
Resource-based approaches to prevent spam have 
been proposed in [1] and [2]: before an e-mail can be 
sent a function has to be calculated which is time- or 
memory-consuming, respectively. These approaches 
faces at least two problems: (1) How can solicited 
bulk e-mail been sent? (2) How can spammers be 
stopped from allocating sufficient resources? 
Address obscuring techniques (AOTs) generally 
aim at either hiding e-mail addresses or restricting 
them to a limited use. An example of the former type 
is the proposal of Hall [5] according to which a user 
can have an arbitrary number of unguessable 
addresses (channels). An approach of the latter group 
is Ioannidis’ proposal of a single-purpose address 
(SPA) which encapsulates a policy in the e-mail 
address [8]. This policy defines the acceptable use of 
the address, e.g. the sender allowed to direct an e-
email to this address. SPAs are cryptographically 
protected to shield them from tampering. AOTs only 
refer to machine-to-person e-mail communication as 
the addresses are difficult to handle for humans. A 
second restriction of AOTs’ usefulness refers to the 
complicated first-time person-to-person contacting  as 
a recipient cannot anticipate all regular e-mail 
connections. 
Blocking e-mails is a broadly used mechanism 
where an e-mail passes or is rejected due to the IP 
address of the sending node. IP addresses of nodes 
known to send spam e-mails are listed on local and/or 
public black lists. For example, ordb.org provides a 
list of open relays, the Spamhaus Project 
(www.spamhaus.org) provides a realtime blacklist of 
IP addresses of verified spam sources as well as an 
Exploits Block List which is a database of IP 
addresses of illegal 3rd party exploits, including open 
proxies, worms/viruses with built-in spam engines, 
and other types of Trojan-horse exploits. Black lists 
are not effective in first-time spamming, where nodes 
send spam e-mails for the first time.  As spammers 
tend to change their IP addresses frequently by 
switching to another ISP or misusing exploits on 
unsuspicious 3rd party nodes black lists can only stop 
corrupt ESPs, as they usually do not change their IPs 
frequently. Blocking whole IP ranges – e.g. belonging 
to ISPs or even countries known to host spammers – 
can address “repeated spamming” but easily leads to a 
digital divide. 
A straightforward option easy to implement is to 
restrict the number of e-mails which can be sent from 
a user’s account. This approach is only applicable 
when an ESP is involved, but even then the automatic 
set-up of an arbitrary number of new e-mail account 
is possible. Some ESPs apply CAPTCHA 
(Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell 
Computers and Humans Apart) procedures which 
provide a numbers or a word which has to be retyped. 
However, current implementations are not effective as 
they are insecure, e.g. [10] presents a procedure 
which is able to detect the content of 92% of all 
pictures created by the Yahoo CAPTCHA process. 
Another attack on visual CAPTCHA processes 
proceeds as follows: the spammer puts the ESP’s 
picture on his own web site and asks users to read the 
text and enter it in a text field manually to gain access 
to adult information. The spammer puts the text 
field’s content in the corresponding text field of the 
ESP’s form. All this can be done automatically. 
Blocking all (uncontrolled) TCP traffic on port 25 
is an option for ISP which is easy to implement and 
prevents spammers’ and exploited computers to send 
spam e-mails when port 25 is used. Activities of 
agents using other ports and connecting with 
gateways are not covered. It must be noted, that this 
approach means to exclude the operation of an MTA 
running on a user’s or company’s computer. 
Environments enabling the recipient to 
authenticate the sender or at least the sending 
organization have been proposed. Public Key 
Cryptography provides the mathematical and 
algorithmic instruments for digital signing documents, 
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) feature the 
organizational framework. As most e-mail user’s do 
not have a personal key pair, current implementations 
aim at authenticating at least organizations and 
(second level) domains. The procedure is 
straightforward: the sending organization signs an e-
mail with its private key, once the sending 
organization’s domain can be verified by applying the 
public key, it can be compared to the domain used by 
the sender in the From: field of the message to detect 
forgeries. An example is Yahoo’s “DomainKeys” 
[14] which is the currently most discussed one. An 
PKI-based approach presumes that the sending 
organization is not corrupt and that its MTAs do not 
suffer from any exploit. A problem with this approach 
arises when spammers get a key pair for a domain 
which is used by them temporarily just for spamming 
purpose. PKI-based approaches are helpful when 
exploits of unsuspicious computers, e.g. spamming 
machines residing on the user’s computer and being 
remotely controllable due to a Trojan horse, try to 
send spam e-mails bypassing the MTAs and the 
signing software of the sender’s organization. Then, 
no authentication on recipient’s side is possible or 
successful. Quite a serious challenge appears when 
spamming software on infected computers reads 
misuses the user’s account information for outgoing 
e-mails including a password. The sending 
organization can not differ between user’s regular e-
mails and e-mails sent by a local spamming machine. 
Another authentication-based approach is the use 
of an Lightweight MTA Authentication Protocol 
(LMAP) [9]. The LMAP family subsumes a set of 
DNS-based approaches where it is checked whether a 
message that claims to be from buffy@sunnydale.com 
was actually sent from an MTA of the sunnydale.com 
organization. If not, the e-mail is a forgery or an 
intermediate MTA was used as external e-mail relay. 
Reverse MX (RMX) Designated Mailers Protocol 
(DMP), Sender Policy Framework (SPF), and 
SenderID belong to most discussed approaches, 
however, no standardization was made and the IETF 
working group MARID was dissolved in 2004. 
LMAP approaches effectively address the 
unauthorized use of relays and gateways but feature 
similar weaknesses as the PKI-based ones. 
 ICANN  has  presented an organizational and 
technological framework proposed by Spamhaus [7] 
in which a new sponsored top level domain (sTLD), 
e.g., .mail, is used. The proposed sTLD will be 
limited for use by the registrant only during the 
process of sending e-mail. A registrant must have 
already registered for a domain key, e.g. icann.org, to 
get the domain key.sTLD, e.g. icann.org.mail. More 
demands to be met by a registrant were proposed, e.g. 
validated whois information must be available, the 
key domain must have been already registered for at 
least 6 months, and an appropriate technological anti-
spam  protection has to be implemented. The 
registrant must inform the central (sponsoring) 
organization  (SO) of the IPs and hostnames of the 
sending mail server. Then, the SO enters A records in 
the DNS for the new domain which enables recipient 
MTAs to use an LMAP or a PKI-based 
authentication. Abuse messages for key.sTLD are 
received by a central organization (sponsoring 
organization) providing a control mechanism. 
Although the framework promises to be effective 
against many spamming procedures one problem 
remains: How can an appropriate technological anti-
spam protection be achieved? The framework does 
not cover the case when zombie PCs – often exploited 
by spammers with Trojan horses – send spam e-mails. 
Summing up the effectiveness of anti-spam 
approaches which is illustrated in table 2 it must be 
stressed that no anti-spam approach is currently 
capable of effectively stopping spammers activities 
which aim at exploiting the ESPs’ infrastructure 
(scenario V). Main problems are still the spammers’ 
option to set-up and then misuse e-mail accounts 
automatically and spammers activities regarding the 
exploits of unsuspicious computers. The latter trouble 
becomes worse as spammers use “botnets” which are 
networks of compromised machines that can be 
remotely controlled by an attacker [13]. 
 
5. Summary and outlook 
 
The modes of spam delivery can be described 
formally with 12 regular expressions. Comparison of 
what are currently the most important anti-spam 
approaches with the modes of spamming show that 
exploitation of PCs and ESP infrastructures are not 
effectively dealt with. Moreover, most activities focus 
on the detection rather than the prevention of spam. 
But this may in fact be counterproductive because 
spammers are encouraged to send even more e-mails 
in order to compensate for losses from detection. 
Anti-spam activities should be performed more 
systematically than is done in current, mainly 
heuristic, anti-spam approaches. Models and formal 
procedures are possibly an adequate way to assess the 
effectiveness of anti-spam approaches and to develop 
new, holistic approaches which would focus on the 
prevention of spam e-mails. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Proof of lemma 1 Technical e-mail nodes can be 
assigned to the organizational unit that acts as sender 
of an e-mail, the sender’s organization (sender’s 
ESP), the recipient, the recipient’s organization 
(recipient’s ESP), and the Internet subsuming all 
other organizational units. On application layer the 
sender can use an MTA, an MUA as defined in RFC 
2821, or any other agent. These nodes correspond to 
the nodes in G denoted as sendMTA , sendMUA , and 
sendOtherAgent , respectively. If a sending 
organization participates in e-mail delivery, it accepts 
incoming e-mails with an SMTP-based MTA, 
denoted as inc
sendOrgMTA in G. Alternatively, e-mails may 
be sent to a sending organization by way of the web 
environment, meaning that all e-mails are passed to 
an internal MTA by a receiving web e-mail server, 
denoted as sendOrgWebServ . A sending organization 
may make internal SMTP-based delivery using two or 
more consecutive MTAs, denoted as sendOrgMTA . No 
other e-mail nodes are generally used by ESPs, 
exceptions being proprietary e-mail nodes. However, 
since any internal non-standard processing of an 
(outgoing) ESP is required by interorganizational e-
mail delivery agreements to be completed with an 
MTA, such e-mail nodes are of no relevance in the 
overall e-mail delivery chain and can be ignored. 
Receiving organizations as a rule take only SMTP-
based e-mail deliveries, and although exceptions do 
exist, they are so uncommon as to be likewise 
negligible. As in the case of the sending organization, 
the MTA responsible for incoming SMTP 
connections, denoted as 
inc
recOrgMTA , may be followed 
by two or more consecutive MTAs, denoted as 
recOrgMTA , before the Mail Delivery Agent (MDA), 
denoted as recOrgMDA , deposits the message in a 
“message store” (mail spool) which a mail server, 
denoted as recOrgMailServ , accesses in order to deliver 
it to the recipient's MUA directly, denoted as 
recOrgMUA , or via a web-based e-mail server, denoted 
as recOrgWebServ . E-mails terminating in a system 
other than SMTP require the existence of a mail 
gateway, but, like the analogous situation at the 
sending organization’s site, this issue is beyond the 
scope of this model. When the Local Mail Transfer 
Protocol (LMTP, RFC2033) is used to relay messages 
to the MDA, the MDA is termed as Local Delivery 
Agent (LDA). Before an e-mail passes the first MTA 
of the receiving organization it may be relayed by an 
intermediate SMTP relay which accepts an e-mail 
sent by a node residing on the sender’s site or on the 
sending organization’s site and transfers it to another 
e-mail node. This includes the scenario where an e-
mail is forwarded to another e-mail node because of a 
mailbox-specific forwarding rule. The SMTP relay 
represents an intermediate Internet e-mail node using 
SMTP both at the incoming and the outgoing 
interface. When other interfaces are used, three 
further intermediate types are possible which are 
used, e.g., for SMTP tunneling and known as 
gateways: BSMTPGW ,  nodes accept SMTP e-mails and 
transfer e-mails with a protocol other than SMTP; 
SMTPAGW ,  performs the inverse process at incoming 
and outgoing interfaces; nodes of type BAGW ,  use 
SMTP neither for incoming nor for outgoing 
messages where A and B can be the same protocol 
(when A=B we usually talk about a proxy, but for 
simplicity we subsume this under gateway). No other 
(important) types of e-mail node are involved in 
Internet e-mail deliveries. Different types are mapped 
onto different vertices (injection), and no vertices 
other than those mentioned exist (surjection), i.e. 
there is a bijection between T and V. ■ 
Proof of proposition 1 The proof is in three steps. 
(1) A function f:S→P is defined, (2) injection of f is 
shown, (3) surjection of f is shown. 
(1) Defining f is straightforward: Given a sequence 
of e-mail nodes 21 |:|,),...,(
≥∈=∈= NksSsss k  
then s is associated with ),...,()( 1 kppsf = , where pi 
is the corresponding vertex to si for all i=1,…,k; s(i) 
exists due to the bijection of lemma 1. It still has to be 
shown that the image of f is a subset of P, i.e. that f(s) 
is a (directed) path in G between Vstart and Vend for all 
s∈S. This is true if and only if for all s∈S, k=|s| holds: 
(pi,pi+1)∈E for all i=1,…,(k-1), i.e. G contains 
directed edges between all vertices which correspond 
to two e-mail nodes appearing consecutively in any 
sequence s∈S. It is easy to see that the latter condition 
is fulfilled. To prove that the first condition is 
fulfilled it is sufficient to show that the design criteria 
for edges in G (see above) are met: an edge e=(v1,v2) 
exists if and only if the Internet e-mail infrastructure 
allows e-mail flow between the corresponding node 
types. To this end, each node v of G is explored with 
reference to the edges incident upon v: 
sendMTA . With a local MTA on the user’s side 
only SMTP connections are possible. SMTP 
connections can be established with an ESP’s 
incoming MTA (e3), with Internet nodes accepting 
SMTP connections, namely an SMTP relay (e2) and a 
gateway (e4), or with an MTA of the receiving 
organization or recipient (e1). Other connections are 
not possible. 
sendMUA . If the e-mail sender operates an MUA, 
he can connect either with all nodes featuring an 
SMTP interface for incoming connections or a with a 
web server of the sending organization. HTTP(S)-
based connections with other nodes are covered by 
the node OtherAgentsend. In the former case, the MUA 
can connect to the same nodes as the MTAsend (e5, e6, 
e7, e9). However, as an MUA is involved the set of 
protocols has to be extended to SMTP*. If a web 
server is connected, then either HTTP or the secure 
version HTTPS may be used. Other connections are 
not possible and are not modeled. 
sendOtherAgent . Other agents are defined as agents 
that use connections other than SMTP-based ones 
( *SMTP ). ESPs and organizations today generally 
accept only SMTP-based e-mail connections, such 
that they can only connect to gateways in the Internet 
(e10, e11) as modeled. 
sendOrgWebServ . A web server of an ESP sends its 
e-mails to an internal MTA (e12). Connections with 
other nodes generally do not exist. 
inc
sendOrgMTA . The MTA responsible for incoming 
messages most commonly SMTP-connects with 
another internal MTA (e13). It may also SMTP-
connect with (an MTA of) the receiving organization 
(e18) – notice that sending and receiving organizations 
may be identical, in which case the involvement of at 
least two MTAs of the ESP is assumed without 
reduction of generality. A third, rarely used 
possibility is for the MTA to establish a connection to 
other e-mail nodes on the Internet, to an SMTP relay 
(e15) or to a gateway (e16). No other connection is 
possible and modeled.  
sendOrgMTA . An MTA getting e-mails from another 
internal MTA can deliver to the same e-mail nodes 
that incsendOrgMTA  can. Edges e17,…,e20 model these 
connections. 
SMTP-Relay. An SMTP relay can connect to the 
same e-mail nodes as sendOrgMTA .  The only exception 
to this is sendOrgMTA  itself, because a sending 
organization is either not involved in the process at all 
or its e-mail environment is already passed. 
Accordingly, we find edges e21,…,e23. 
BSMTPGW , . E-mail nodes denoted as BSMTPGW ,  are 
defined as nodes which make outgoing connections 
other than SMTP-based ones. The only nodes to be 
considered are BAGW ,  (e24) and SMTPAGW ,  (e25). 
SMTPAGW , . This denotes gateways with outgoing 
SMTP connections. That is, they can  connect with 
the same nodes as an SMTP relay (e26,…,e28). 
BAGW , . Regarding outgoing connections, this kind 
of gateway can be treated  same way as a node of type 
BSMTPGW , . Hence, we find edges e29 and e30. 
inc
recOrgMTA . An MTA at the recipient’s end 
accepting SMTP connections can either deliver, 
forward, or reject an e-mail. If it is delivered, it  
passes the e-mail either to the local MDA (e30) or to 
another internal MTA (e31); in both cases we find 
internal e-mail processing. If it is delivered, then it 
either passes the e-mail to the local MDA (e30) or to 
another internal MTA (e31); in both cases we find an 
internal e-mail processing. Because forwarding or 
rejection of an e-mail initializes a new sequence, as 
mentioned earlier, edges dedicated to both are not 
integrated. 
recOrgMTA . An internal MTA getting e-mails from 
inc
recOrgMTA either passes an e-mail to another internal 
MTA (e34) using SMTP or to the local MDA (e33). 
This process is denoted internal delivery. 
recOrgMDA . The MDA is responsible for storing an 
e-mail in the recipient’s local e-mail box residing on 
the mail server recOrgMailServ  (e37). This is the second 
step of the internal e-mail delivery. 
recOrgMailServ . Most mail servers provide an 
interface for recipients’ MUAs which access the 
user’s e-mails with a mail access protocol such as 
IMAP or POP. These protocols are pull protocols, 
because the MUA initiates the dialogue with the mail 
server. However, when a connection like the present 
is established, e-mails are directed to the MUA. 
Alternatively, a mail server can provide an internal 
interface for a web server (e36). 
recOrgWebServ . The web server is an intermediate 
node between the mail server and the MUA and 
allows an HTTP-based access of e-mails (e38). As 
web browsers are usually installed on users' devices 
this kind of platform-independent e-mail access is 
broadly available and convenient. 
recMUA . The destination of an e-mail is the 
recipient’s MUA. recMUA does not have any outgoing 
edges, because any outgoing connection relates to the 
forwarding of an e-mail and is thus treated as a new 
sequence. 
It is proved by this exploration that the image of f 
is a subset of P. 
(2) Injection of f follows directly from lemma  1. 
(3) Surjection of f means that each path in G from 
21 VVvstart ∪∈  to MailServrecOrg has an inverse 
image in S. It has been already shown that each edge 
e=(v,w) ∈ E corresponds to exactly one type of e-
mail connection between the e-mail nodes 
corresponding to v and w. This means, given a path 
p∈P, that for each edge e=(v,w)∈E with v and w 
being successive nodes in p there exists one and only 
one e-mail connection between e-mail nodes 
represented by v and w. So, each path p∈P has an 
inverse image in S. ■ 
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